The debtor filed a chapter 12 plan and three amended chapter 12 plans; none of the plans were confirmed.  The two largest creditors and the chapter 12 trustee objected to each plan.  The debtor’s two largest secured creditors objected to their treatment under the plan and advocated for dismissal, citing unreasonable delay that is prejudicial to the creditors, under 11 U.S.C. § 1208(c)(1), and the continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation, under 11 U.S.C. § 1208(c)(9).  The farm sought confirmation of its fourth chapter 12 plan over the objections of its creditors, or in the alternative leave to amend in order to file a fifth plan in hopes that it might be confirmed.  One of the creditors urged the court to deny any further leave to amend and simply dismiss the case.  The court denied confirmation of the plan and denied the debtor leave to amend the plan.  The court then dismissed the case.

The Court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, finding the debt owed to it by the debtor was nondischargeable, pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 523(a)(2)(A), as arising from the debtor's fraud.  The Court held that the debt, which arose from a default judgment in an Oklahoma state court for fraud, was nondischargeable, based on the relative closeness of the Oklahoma and Bankruptcy Code standards for fraud and the particular wording of the Oklahoma judgment, which suggested the Oklahoma court had received sufficient evidence in support of the motion.  Furthermore, the debtor appeared to have participated in the state-court proceedings until his counsel withdrew, at which time the court informed him he could retain other counsel but he did not.  

Court ruled that provisions of a separation agreement wherein Husband agreed to pay certain expenses to the Wife on a monthly basis were nondischargeable under Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(15).  Specifically, the Court found that the Separation Agreement created a new debt for which the Husband was liable to the Wife, which they then incorporated into the Property Settlement Agreement as part of their divorce.  Accordingly, the Court found that the debt arose in contemplation of divorce, as required by section 523(a)(15).

            The court had entered an order in an adversary proceeding.  After the fourteen-day time period to appeal had lapsed, the court closed the adversary proceeding and subsequently closed the debtor’s main bankruptcy case.  Thereafter, the government filed a motion to reopen the case, asserting that the court had only ruled on one of the two claims in the debtor’s complaint and thus the order was not a final order.  Therefore, the government argued, because the court closed the adversary proceeding and main bankruptcy case without having entered a final judgment, the court did so inappropriately and cause existed to reopen the case. 

            The court found that the government had not met its burden in showing sufficient cause existed to reopen the case and that reopening would be futile and a waste of judicial resources.  The court held that the opinion and order constituted a final judgment and reopening the case would only afford the government additional time to file an appeal, which is not a “compelling circumstance.”