The summaries on this website are summaries of the opinions issued by the judges of the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia from October 2004 to date. The opinions may be searched by year, judge, category and chapter. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword in the search box above. This opinion bank, however, is not an exhaustive list of opinions issued by the judges of the Western District. These summaries are not intended to replace other research methods, but may be used as a starting point for your research. These summaries do not contain information as to whether an opinion has been published, appealed or the disposition of any such appeal, or otherwise overruled or affected by subsequent case law or statute. These summaries have been prepared for the convenience of the researcher and in no way constitute an interpretation by the Court of the opinion summarized. Please rely on the opinion not the summary. Please contact Judge Connelly's chambers or Judge Black's chambers regarding any questions or errors.
The Court declined to dismiss the Chapter 7 case under section 707(b) for substantial abuse, despite the fact that the Debtor had disposable income, after analyzing the factors outlined in Green v. Staples (In re Green), 934 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1991).
The Court approved the Chapter 7 Trustee's fee application after conducting the lodestar analysis.
The Court determined that when a petition is filed after the dismissal of a prior case that was pending within one year, the language in Section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the stay only with respect to pre-petition action taken against the Debtor. Where no such pre-petition actions were taken, it was not necessary to continue the stay under 362(c)(3)(B).
The court remanded a state court action that was initiated after the Chapter 7 case was closed and the Debtor received a discharge, because the Debtor failed to comply with Rule 9027(a)(3) (requiring the filing of Notice of Removal no later than 30 days after a claim or cause of action is asserted in another court).
The Court denied a motion for summary judgment in favor of creditors that purchased real property of the estate, where the creditors argued that purchasing the real property extinguished liability to the estate for unpaid rent.
The Plaintiff filed a Complaint to determine that its claim was excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Pursuant to Section 523(a)(6), debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to the property or person of another are nondischargeable. Under Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998), in order to satisfy the requirements of Section 523(a)(6), a plaintiff must plead and prove that the debtor engaged in acts that caused an injury to the plaintiff, and (a) that the debtor acted willfully, with actual intent, objective or subjective, to cause injury to the plaintiff, where the harm was not merely the result of negligent or reckless acts of the debtor, and (b) that the debtor acted with malice. Under this standard, the Plaintiff in this case failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor acted with actual objective or subjective intent to cause injury to the Plaintiff when the debtor liquidated the collateral and spent half of the cash receipts from the sale on business operations.
The court denied the Debtors' motion to reopen their Chapter 7 bankruptcy case and file an adversary proceeding to avoid judgment liens recorded against their real property within ninety days of the original filing, because the Debtors did not claim that the liens impaired their exempt property. The court also highlighted its previous holding that such a motion requires payment of the standard reopening fee.
The court denied the Debtor's requested waiver of the requirement to obtain credit counseling prior to filing based on exigent circumstances and dismissed the case without prejudice at the Debtor's request.
The court denied the joint-filing Debtors' application for waiver of the Chapter 7 filing fee after determining that their combined monthly income did not exceed 150% of the poverty line for family of four, because the Debtors received a tax return that would have enabled them to pay the fee and they could afford to pay in installments. Despite the fact that the Debtors were separated and maintained separate households, child support paid to a joint debtor should not be listed as a monthly expense of the payor spouse or as monthly income of the payee spouse.
The court declined to enter a proposed consent order that provided an undersecured creditor with an unsecured claim for post-petition attorneys' fees and costs because 11 U.S.C. § 506 only authorizes contractually authorized attorneys' fees for fully secured claims.