The summaries on this website are summaries of the opinions issued by the judges of the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia from October 2004 to date. The opinions may be searched by year, judge, category and chapter. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword in the search box above. This opinion bank, however, is not an exhaustive list of opinions issued by the judges of the Western District. These summaries are not intended to replace other research methods, but may be used as a starting point for your research. These summaries do not contain information as to whether an opinion has been published, appealed or the disposition of any such appeal, or otherwise overruled or affected by subsequent case law or statute. These summaries have been prepared for the convenience of the researcher and in no way constitute an interpretation by the Court of the opinion summarized. Please rely on the opinion not the summary. Please contact Judge Connelly's chambers or Judge Black's chambers regarding any questions or errors.
The Debtor filed a motion seeking an extension of the automatic stay and requesting the Court enjoin the City of Lynchburg and a utility company from collecting any further deposit or disrupting the Debtor’s utility service. The Court dismissed the motion as moot because the Debtor had duplicated the relief requested from previous motions, which were set for separate hearing.
In a Chapter 7 case, the Debtor filed a motion seeking to “set a fair and reasonable deposit for water in the City of Lynchburg,” to enjoin “any further collection for any and all past due amounts,” and to enjoin “any disconnection of services.” At the hearing on the motion, the Court determined that the City made no effort to collect any pre-petition debt, that the Debtor owed the City less than $10.00 for post-petition water services, that the City had no intention of collecting a deposit from the Debtor unless the Debtor became significantly delinquent in the future.
The Court denied the motion, holding that, because the City did not intend to collect a deposit at the time, there was no need to set a deposit amount. Further, because the automatic stay of § 362(a) remained in effect, and because the discharge injunction under § 524(c)(2) was to take effect upon expiration of the automatic stay, there was no need to issue an order enjoining the City from attempting to collect any dischargeable debt arising pre-petition. The court also determined that it did not have jurisdiction over the post-petition disconnection policies or decisions of the City.
The chapter 13 trustee objected to confirmation of plans in two unrelated cases based on failure to provide for the retention of a lien by an allowed secured claim holder in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i). The trustee argued that confirmation should be denied because both plans provided for a cramdown of secured debts without adequate notice to the creditors. Counsel for the debtors contended that because the creditors will be paid their petition-date claims in full, the total amounts owing on the filing date upon the obligations as determined under nonbankruptcy law will be paid in full, albeit not necessarily with post-petition interest at the rates provided in the applicable contracts. The Court determined that section 1325(a)(5)(A) contemplates an express rather than an implied acceptance of a plan’s treatment by the impaired creditor. The Court concluded that the failure of the creditors affected by the provisions challenged by the trustee to object to them does not mean that the creditors have “accepted” such treatment within the meaning of section 1325(a)(5)(A). The Court thus sustained the trustee’s objection.
A non-core, related false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress state-court action was removed to the district court and referred to the bankruptcy court for consideration of the defendants’ summary judgment motion. The court found that the debtor was not judicially estopped from pursuing the action and recommended that district court grant summary judgment as it related to the availability of punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress but deny summary judgment as to all other issues.
The debtor filed a Motion for Distribution requesting that its attorneys' fees be paid from escrowed funds held in trust by the debtor, all of which serves as the collateral for secured creditors. The Court granted the debtor's motion in part, holding that the debtor may distribute the attorneys' fees from the proceeds from the sale of real property. A secured creditor also filed a Motion for Distribution, seeking that any distribution be pro rata between the secured creditors. Under 11 U.S.C. § 506(c), the Court found that the motion filed by the secured creditor for any such distribution to be made pro rata between secured creditors is not appropriate as a pro rata distribution is not proper under the Bankruptcy Code. The Court held that the remainder of the escrowed funds shall be distributed to claim holders in the order of priority.
The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors filed a Motion for Distribution seeking for its attorneys' fees to be paid from escrowed funds, all of which served as the collateral for secured creditors. The Court held that the Committee may not be compensated from the collateral of secured creditors. Accordingly, the Court denied the Committee's Motion for Distribution.
The debtors filed a complaint to determine the validity and extent of the credit union’s lien on the debtors’ residence and to strip the lien from the debtors’ residence. The credit union responded disputing the debtors’ valuation. The court found that the second lien, which the debtors were attempting to strip off, was secured to the extent of the equity exceeding the balance of the first lien.
Court overruled debtor's objection to proof of claim based on the statute of limitations contained in Va. Code section 8.3A-118. Creditor did not file a response to the objection. Court held that the debt was revived under Va. Code section 8.01-229(G) by the debtor's acknowledgment of the debt in her schedules and chapter 13 plan. Claim was allowed in the full principal amount plus simple interest.
Chapter 7 debtor moved to redeem a 2006 Dodge Durango. The vehicle had been acquired through financing provided by Capital One Auto Finance, which objected to the debtor’s motion disagreeing over the value of the vehicle. The Bankruptcy Code provides in § 722 a right to individual debtors to redeem tangible personal property “intended primarily for personal, family, or household purposes” from a lien secured by such property. The Court concluded that the correct standard was the “replacement” value rather than the “liquidation” value, citing 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2); that debtor bears the burden of proving that the property is worth less than the amount owing to the creditor which is secured by a lien upon such property; that proper valuation date is the petition filing date rather than the hearing date upon a redemption motion; and that statements contained in the schedules of a bankruptcy debtor can constitute binding admissions of the factual matters set forth in such schedules. The Court allowed the debtor to redeem the vehicle at a value it determined based on the evidence presented.
Creditor filed adversary proceeding to determine whether her debt was excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(6). Court held that the state court order directing debtor to turn over tax refund did not create property interest in tax refund sufficient to permit the Court to find that debtor's spending of tax refund was conversion of creditor's property; creditor failed to show debtor committed an intentional tort and that the intentional tort was conduct substantially certain to result in injury or was motivated by a desire to inflict injury.