The summaries on this website are summaries of the opinions issued by the judges of the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia from October 2004 to date. The opinions may be searched by year, judge, category and chapter. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword in the search box above. This opinion bank, however, is not an exhaustive list of opinions issued by the judges of the Western District. These summaries are not intended to replace other research methods, but may be used as a starting point for your research. These summaries do not contain information as to whether an opinion has been published, appealed or the disposition of any such appeal, or otherwise overruled or affected by subsequent case law or statute. These summaries have been prepared for the convenience of the researcher and in no way constitute an interpretation by the Court of the opinion summarized. Please rely on the opinion not the summary. Please contact Judge Connelly's chambers or Judge Black's chambers regarding any questions or errors.
The debtors moved to reopen their chapter 7 case because “they have learned it will help them reestablish their credit rating if the debt [on their mortgage] is reaffirmed.” The court found that the debtors did not show that reopening of the case would afford relief to the debtors and thus declined to reopen the case.
The debtor began, but did not finish, the credit counseling briefing required by 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1) before filing her chapter 7 bankruptcy; she did not receive a certificate of completion until eight days after filing her petition. Because the debtor did not complete the briefing before filing the petition as required by the statute, the court dismissed the case.
Court ruled that debtor who failed to complete credit counseling under Bankruptcy Code § 109(h) was not eligible to be a debtor. Without a showing of deferment or exigent circumstances, the Court could not authorize the debtor to file certification of completion after petitioning for bankruptcy protection, even if she filed the certificate only eight days after filing the petition.
Court held that claimant had not carried her burden of proving debtor's debt he owed to her was the result of a "willful and malicious injury," when the claimant produced no evidence at trial other than the existence of a default judgment from the state court. The Court held that without at least some showing of intent, which the claimant asserted she did not need to provide because of the state court's default judgment, the Court could not find that the claimant had proven the debtor intended to cause the harm leading to the debt under Bankruptcy Code section 523(a)(6). Of particular importance to the Court was the fact that the underlying state-court action (carnal knowledge of a minor) did not require the state court to find any intentional wrongdoing on the part of the debtor, so the default judgment alone failed to prove any intent to inflict injury, let alone a "willful and malicious" infliction of injury.
The United States Trustee filed a motion for an order requiring an alleged bankruptcy petition preparer to disgorge fees received from the debtor, pay damages to the debtor, and be fined for each violation of section 110 of the Bankruptcy Code. The court found that Mr. Jennings had functioned as an undisclosed bankruptcy petition preparer. The court determined that the $2,000 amount set forth in section 110(i)(1)(B)(i) was applicable. The court also imposed a fine of $500 because the failure to disclose was intentional; such amount was tripled pursuant to section 110(b)(2) and paid to the Office of the United States Trustee pursuant to section 110(l)(4)(A).
The debtors filed a motion to reopen their case in order to enter into a reaffirmation agreement with their mortgage company. Their case had already been closed with a discharge. The court concluded that no purpose would be served in reopening the case to allow the debtors to enter into a reaffirmation agreement because under 11 U.S.C. § 524 a reaffirmation agreement to be legally effective must be entered into before a discharge is granted.
Plaintiffs initiated an adversary proceeding seeking a determination that the debt they allegedly held against the debtors was non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), including for fraud in the inducement, false representation, and actual fraud. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to establish liability on a claim. Without liability on a claim, the court held that the plaintiffs could not show that the debtors owed them a debt. The existence of a debt is an essential element of a section 523(a)(2)(A) action. Moreover, the court determined that the plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the debt allegedly owed was non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). Therefore, the court granted the debtors’ Rule 52(c) motion.
The court considered whether a lease of farming property owned by the defendants was validly terminated by them before the filing of the debtor’s chapter 12 case. The court concluded that the failure of the property owners to make a demand for payment for unpaid rent due under the lease before notifying the debtor that the lease had been terminated meant that such notice of termination was ineffective.
Attorney filed final applications for compensation, and the debtor’s sole shareholder objected to the compensation based on a conflict of interest that he asserted the attorney did not adequately disclose. The court allowed most of the attorney’s fees but disallowed as a sanction certain amounts based on the conduct and nondisclosure of the attorney.
Both the debtors and the trustee filed an objection to proof of claim. The court overruled the trustee’s objection but sustained the debtors’ objection, because the debtors’ objection was sufficient to carry their burden of calling into question the validity of the proof of claim other than lack of documentation and the claimant did not prove the validity and amount of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence.