Creditor's motion to reinstate case denied as not filed within ten day period for filing a request for alteration or amendment of judgment under Rule 9023 and as creditor did not state grounds for relief under Rule 9024.  Case dismissed for failure to timely file certain schedules and other required documents. A motion to reinstate a dismissed case is in the nature of a motion to vacate the dismissal order, which if not brought within ten days of dismissal, must show grounds for relief under Rule 9024. Prior to filing, creditor scheduled auction of certain real estate, but counsel for creditor was not informed of the filing prior to the auction.  Parties that entered into the purchase agreements at foreclosure auction are not protected by Section 549(c) because there was no transfer of an interest in real property within the meaning and intent of that section as the bidders learned of the bankruptcy filing prior to closing.  Creditor should have sought annulment of the automatic stay retroactive to time of filing.

The matter before the Court is the plaintiff's complaint to determine the dischargeability of debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), and the defendant's motion for summary judgment.  The debt in question was the result of a $20,000 jury verdict from a circuit court case.  In that case, the circuit court refused to award punitive damages, finding that the defendant's actions were not willful or malicious.  The Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies in this case, finding that because punitive damages under Virginia state law requires a lower threshold for demonstrating willful and malicious action, and because the circuit court found that the defendant's actions were not willful or malicious, the plaintiff is precluded from relitigating the issue and therefore cannot establish a necessary element of Section 523(a)(6).   Accordingly, the Court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that there is no genuine issue of material fact.

Debtor sought a ruling that he performed obligations under sections 521(a) and 362(h) or, alternatively, for approval of two reaffirmation agreements with State Farm regarding two auto loan debts.  Counsel did not represent the debtor in the negotiation of the reaffirmation agreements and did not execute Part C of the agreements as debtor's budget clearly indicated that there was a presumption of undue hardship. Knowing he could not achieve reaffirmation, but as he was current on his monthly payments, he sought a ruling that he complied with all statutory obligations for reaffirmation in order to restrain State Farm post-discharge from exercising its contractual rights and its state law remedies unless he defaulted.  Court held that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to determine that debtor performed under sections 362(h) and 521(a) solely for purposes of determining that section 521(d) was not applicable and that State Farm was restrained by the post-discharge injunction from declaring the note and security agreement in default as a result of the ipso facto clause.  However, even if subject matter jurisdiction attached, the debtor did not enter into the reaffirmation agreements in good faith but solely for the purpose of satisfying the statutory requirements necessary to restrain State Farm from exercising its ipso facto clause post-discharge.  Therefore, Court denied approval of the reaffirmation agreements and dismissed his motion for a ruling that he performed under sections 362(h) and 521(a).

Using the standard set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Court denied in part the trustee's motion to dismiss a counterclaim under Bankruptcy Rule 7012(b)(6) (incorporating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)) because the Court found that it is not plausible that a reference in a deed of trust to a county tax map parcel number which is inconsistent with the metes and bounds description of the property intended to be conveyed serves as notice to a competent title examiner of Virginia land records that such description cannot be relied upon because it is or may be either totally wrong or may describe only part of the property intended by the parties to be encumbered by the deed of trust.  However, the Court sustained the motion with respect to any claim based on the street address referenced in the deed of trust, any claim based on the deed of trust purportedly refinanced by the deed of trust, and any claim of equitable subrogation.