The summaries on this website are summaries of the opinions issued by the judges of the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia from October 2004 to date. The opinions may be searched by year, judge, category and chapter. For a more detailed search, enter a keyword in the search box above. This opinion bank, however, is not an exhaustive list of opinions issued by the judges of the Western District. These summaries are not intended to replace other research methods, but may be used as a starting point for your research. These summaries do not contain information as to whether an opinion has been published, appealed or the disposition of any such appeal, or otherwise overruled or affected by subsequent case law or statute. These summaries have been prepared for the convenience of the researcher and in no way constitute an interpretation by the Court of the opinion summarized. Please rely on the opinion not the summary. Please contact Judge Connelly's chambers or Judge Black's chambers regarding any questions or errors.
The Court held that (1) under 11 U.S.C. § 727(b), a Chapter 7 discharge discharges the debtor from all debts that arose before the date of the order for relief under Chapter 7, and (2) under 11 U.S.C. § 348(a), the conversion of a case from a case under one chapter to a case under another chapter constitutes an order for relief, but does not change the date of the order for relief.
The Court denied the trustee's complaint (1) for injunctive and declaratory relief and (2) for authority to sell property of a co-owner free and clear of all liens, claims, rights and interests pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(b), (f) and (h) against debtor because the trustee failed to meet his burden of proof and, as required in Webber and Burkholder Corp. v. Rogers (In re Webber), 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18415 (W.D. Va. 1988), establish (through consideration, actual authority, or otherwise) the debtor's ownership interest in a terminated corporation for which the debtor and the debtor's father are trustees in liquidation under Va. Code § 13.1-751(A).
In this pre BAPCPA case, the Court held that the proper rate of interest to be applied to the Treasurer of Buchanan County's post petition administrative claim for unpaid personal property taxes is the rate provided by applicable nonbankruptcy Virginia law under section 58.1-3916 of the Virginia Code.
The debtor filed motion to redeem personal property of her estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 722, namely, a vehicle. The issue before the Court is the appropriate redemption value for the vehicle. The debtor, in her motion, seeks to set the redemption price of the car based on the Kelley Blue Book for Private Party Value, which is the "price a retail merchant would charge for the property." The Court held that setting the value based on the Kelley Blue Book for Private Party Value, without taking into account the Suggested Retail Value, conflicts with the language of Va. Code § 8.01- 419.1 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) because the Private Party Value does not take into account retail merchant price for the property; rather, the Private Party Value focuses on private party transactions. Thus, the Court held that while movants are not precluded from using Kelley Blue Book as a starting point for valuation, in order to be consistent with 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2), the retail value must be the starting point for any valuation in redemption proceedings under Section 722.
The debtor filed an application for waiver of the Chapter 7 filing fee (application to proceed in forma pauperis) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f). The Court went through the two-step analysis and determined that the debtor's monthly income is less than 150% of the poverty guidelines published by the United States Department of Health and Human Services applicable to her family size, which satisfies the first prong, but the debtor has not shown that she is unable to pay the filing fee in installments, so she fails the second prong. Concluding that the debtor did not meet her burden of proving that she is unable to pay the filing fee in installments as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f)(1), the Court denied the debtor's application to waive the Chapter 7 filing fee.
The Court denied an alleged debtor's motion seeking an order compelling the petitioning creditor to file a bond because the alleged debtor introduced no evidence supporting an allegation that the petitioning creditor filed the involuntary petition in bad faith under 11 U.S.C. § 303(i).
The Court held that, due to the hanging paragraph of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5), a Chapter 13 debtor may surrender collateral in full satisfaction of a secured creditor's claim when: (i) the value of the collateral is less than the amount of the claim, (ii) the collateral is a vehicle purchased during the 910-day period pre-petition, (iii) the vehicle is for the debtor's personal use, and (iv) the creditor's interest is a purchase money security interest (a "910 vehicle"). Further, the Court held that if a debtor elects to retain a 910 vehicle under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B), the debtor is required to pay the claim in full during the pendency of the plan because the hanging paragraph eliminates the mechanism (11 U.S.C. § 506(a)) of bifurcating a claim secured by collateral of a value less than the amount of the claim, and therefore, the claim is treated as a fully secured claim.
The Court held that, due to the hanging paragraph of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5), a Chapter 13 debtor may surrender collateral in full satisfaction of a secured creditor's claim when: (i) the value of the collateral is less than the amount of the claim, (ii) the collateral is a vehicle purchased during the 910-day period pre-petition, (iii) the vehicle is for the debtor's personal use, and (iv) the creditor's interest is a purchase money security interest (a "910 vehicle"). Further, the Court held that if a debtor elects to retain a 910 vehicle under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B), the debtor is required to pay the claim in full during the pendency of the plan because the hanging paragraph eliminates the mechanism (11 U.S.C. § 506(a)) of bifurcating a claim secured by collateral of a value less than the amount of the claim, and therefore, the claim is treated as a fully secured claim.
The Court denied (without prejudice to any rights the debtor may have under non-bankruptcy law) the debtor's objection to a creditor's claims because the debtor failed to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of validity accorded to the creditor's properly filed claims by 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 3001(f).
The Court denied debtor's motion to amend (under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, as made applicable under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9023) an order granting the Chapter 7 trustee's motion to compel the turnover of one-half of the debtor's tax refund generated during the pre-petition period under 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) because (1) debtor's wife did not petition for bankruptcy with debtor, (2) the tax refund is property of the estate based on In re Shearin, 224 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 2000) because debtor had an ownership interest in at least some portion of the tax refund that he could have asserted against his wife, (3) debtor failed to timely file a homestead deed exempting the refund or any portion thereof, and (4) there is no exclusion for earned income credits in the Bankruptcy Code.